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A THEORETICAL REVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
STATE TAXES AND AGGREGATE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
RATES, WITH AN EMPIRICAL TEST

Much research has been done to discover how taxes affect the
labor decisions of
market hours.

ho~seholds,

particularly with respect to

The purpose of this paper is to create a

theoretical link between market participation and market hours
under an infinite set of household perceptions about the flowback of tax payments as public transfers.

And finally, a link is

made between the typical micro-level analysis of these choices to
the aggregated data that are more readily available to policy
makers.
Initial theoretical works by Milton Friedman (1949, 1976)
and the general equilibrium approach taken by Gwartney and Stroup
(1983) show that when tax revenues flow back to the household in
the form of transfers, there is only a compensated substitution
effect.

There is no income effect in this case because the tax
J

payment is added back into household income as a non-wage public
transfer of income.
Assuming for the moment that public sector spending is
perceived by the average individual in the aggregate economy as a
dollar-for-dollar offset to taxes paid, the change ir- work hours
and labor force participation can be shown graphically.

In the

case of increasing linear taxes, the expected wage fa l ls from w
to w' as non-wage income increases from Yn to Yn', which

increases the reservation wage.
hours fall from Tiw to Tiw '.

The net result is that market

Further, the probability of labor

force participation in the aggregate falls due to converging
expected and reservation wages (see Figure 1).

This of course

assumes that gross real wages and gross real asset income are
held constant, and that the economy remains on a given production
possibilities frontier.
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NON-WAGE INCOME COMPENSATION FOR REDUCED
WAGES IN THE PRESENCE OF TAXES

(Hausman and Ruud, 1984; Triest, 1990) have

empirically analyzed the effect of taxes on the labor hours
supplied by men and women.

Hausman and Ruud found that the

elasticity associated with net wages was .26 for men and .32 for
women.

These low elasticity values were verified by Triest who

estimated uncompensated wage elasticities for men between -.02

3

and .06,

and uncompensated elasticities for women between .03

and .28, depending on the method used.
These low wage elasticities are taken to suggest that as net
wages fall due to increasing taxes, there must be an income
effect which counters the dominating substitution effect
hypothesized by Friedman and others.

Blomquist (1988)

suggests

that the reason empirical researchers are deriving such low net
wage elasticities is that they fail to account for the
nonlinearity of the tax structure.

Blomquist argues that

nonlinear tax rates shift the supply curves of different income
earning groups, and that the net result is an empirical
estimation which is misleading and far less elastic than it
should be.
On the other hand, MaCurdy et ale

(1990) argue that studies

which account for nonlinear taxes using a piecewise budget set in
a maximum likelihood model will typically generate larger
substitution and lower income elasticities than with other
methods.

These authors suggest that this result is not due to

theory but the implicit assumptions involved in using maximum
likelihood methods

(i.e., forcing Slutsky conditions and

inequality restrictions on Slutsky terms) .
In summary, reviewing the literature, which has a primary
focus on market hours, does little to clarify the issue of how
taxes affect the labor decisions of households.

However, in all

of these studies, the point of attack or defense is related to
the relative size of the income and substitution effects

4

associated with the imposition of taxes on income, which is
directly related to the extent to which tax payments flow back as
transfers.
Given the diverse empirical and theoretical examples listed
above, it may be that the simultaneous existence of substitution
and income effects, and/or work hours constraints, minimize the
observable impact on market hours in the aggregate.

A more

fruitful line of research for empirically determining the impact
of taxes on households may focus less on the market hours
question and more on the participation decision.

While this line

of research will not logically lead to information about market
hours and output fluctuations,

it may lead to greater information

about the impact on household welfare as individuals decide to
participate in the market.
Particularly in the presence of fixed hours constraints, the
initial decision to enter the market is associated with far
greater individual and social costs than is the decision to work
an additional hour; and is, therefore, much more socially
relevant.
A.

Theoretical Explanation of the Impact of Taxes
on Labor Supply Decisions

There is often a disharmony between changes in market hours
and the participation decision.

The purpose of this section is

to show that this disharmony may exist with respect to changes in
tax rates, in support of the notion that examining the impact of
5

taxes on participation rates versus market hours may lead one to
opposite conclusions.
The impact of taxes on participation rates and market hours
can be generalized by maximizing a typical interdependent utility
function.

From this maximization process, a Slutsky

decomposition of the influences on participation and market hours
can be created.
The ith individual in a household maximizes the utility
function:

where Ii is leisure time, C1 is the value of the individual's
consumption, and U j is the utility of the jth person(s) in the
household. Including the utility of the jth person forces
interdependence of utility between family members.
Leisure time within the utility function is simply defined
as:

where T is total time available, Tw is time spent in wage
earning, and TiHP is time spent in individual non-wage household
production of goods and services, noting that some of li and TiHP
may be time spent jointly with other household members.
Individual consumption, C1 ,

is composed of purchased goods

and services, Xi' and the money value of goods and

produced by the household, Zl .

se~vices

The value of C1 can be expressed
6

as:
Ci=PXi+Zi

(3)

where P is the price of consumer goods and services.

The value

of Zi is assumed to be equal to the opportunity costs (disposable
wages forgone)

associated with the hours spent on household

production, Zi= wi'T iHP ' where prime values indicate disposable
wages and income.

The value of household production of goods and

services can be expressed as:

Z=W~TiHP+wjTjHP (4)
which implies that Z = Zi + Zj.
A production constraint is imposed on (4) through the time
identity in (2) which shows time to be a zero-sum commodity.
budget constraint is imposed on consumption of
PXi =CP1 =Yd - (S+Cpj )'

Xi

A

in that

(5)

where Yd is the disposable income of the household, S is
household saving, and Cpj is purchased consumption by the jth
person(s) .
The time constraint is directly tied to a budget constraint
Y d =( (TiwWi+TjwWj) +Ytr+Ya ) -Taxes

(6)

where disposable household income depends directly on the time
allocated to market hours by the ith and jth persons, the
respective wages of these persons
asset income (Y a ) , and taxes.

(Wi

and wj ) , transfe:-s

(Y t =)

,

Asset income in time period t can

be expressed as
7

Ya (t) =(Ya (t - 1) +S(t-l)-Ca (t)

)I(t)-TaxeS(t)I

(7)

where Ca is consumption of wealth, which can be assumed to be a
function of unemployment, position in life-cycle, and duration of
unemployment.

The risk-free component of the interest rate (r)

is typically determined by the Treasury when it issues short-term
securities, and is therefore exogenous.

The remainder of the

interest rate is a function of the relative risk involved in the
household asset portfolio.
Optimal leisure, market, and household production time can
be found by maximizing individual utility in equation (1),
subject to budget and time constraints.

A Slutsky decomposition

is created below to show the hypothesized impact of changing
monetary factors and competing time uses.
The time and money constraints can be expressed in a single
full-income equation as

Where prime values are net of taxes, this implies that the
expenditures on goods (the value of market time by the ith and
jth persons) plus expenditures on leisure plus the value of
household production are equal to the total value of time for the
ith and jth persons, plus non-wage income.

Therefore, the system

of equations provided above implies that market, leisure, and
household production hours are a function of wages and non-wage
income, so that

T~

= f(w i

',

wj ' , Yn').
8

The Slutsky is derived

directly as a total differential of this e xpression

(9)

which shows that the total change in market hours is composed of
the own-wage compensated substitution effect plus the cross-wage
compensated substitution effect, plus the full income effect
(Keeley, 1981).

It is important to understand at this point that

wages of the jth person change the budget constraint of the ith
person through non-wage income (private transfers) .
The first partial derivative of Ti w with respect to Yn'
negative.

It is assumed that the sign of the utility held

constant (compensated)
respect to

is

Wi'

first partial derivative of Th; with

is positive.

now be defined as Ya' + Yt

,

After-tax non-wage income, Yn', can
or, net asset income plus transfers

(public and private), which are assumed to be non-taxable.
If it is assumed that households may not perceive the tax
payments they make flowing back to them as transfers, then
imposing an income tax that does not discriminate between wage
and non-wage income reduces both non-wage income and wages.
Under this assumption, altering the wage a l one implies both an
income and substitution effect.

The actua l impact on hours

worked due to the change in the net wage wi ll depend on the
relative dominance of the income or substi tution effect, assuming
no offsetting increase in transfers.

Chan ges in non- wage income

alone will only cause an income effect.
9

Therefore, t he net

impact on market hours due to a simple income tax depends on the
relative strength of the substitution effect due to a change in
wage rates, and the income effects due to changes in asset income
and wages.
The regions of substitution or income effect dominance of
changing the wage rate alone can be shown graphically, by
assuming a two-dimensional indifference mapping (Figure 2)
between leisure time (li)

and disposable income (Y d )

market time of the jth person is zero.

,

where

It is assumed that a

constant level of nonwage income (Y n ) will exist if no perceived
transfers occur.
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2.

REGIONS OF DOMINANT INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION
EFFECTS DUE TO CHANGING WAGE RATES

Note that as the net wage is reduced from near-infinity,
market hours rise to a positive maximum at

T i w*

and then begin to

fall toward zero, where the expected net wage is equal to the
reservation Jwage.

Where wages are inversely related to work

hours, the income effect is dominant over the income effect.
Where wages are directly related to work hours, the substitution
effect is dominant over the income effect.
As stated earlier, changes in non-wage income wi l l only
cause an income effect.

Given this information, if a particular

household faces a ten percent effective tax rate,

11

the~

both

Wi

and Ya are reduced by ten percent, causing both a downward
rotation and downward shift of the budget constraint.

Theoretical Extension to Aggregate Analysis.

If it is assumed that the indifference set, asset income,
and expected wage are for an average individual in a particular
state, then it will be true that a distribution exists around the
expected reservation wage, expected wage, and asset income.
Given this, the probability of labor force participation can be
expressed as
=f(wage)-g(a(Yn»
p ( LFP )
f()
wage

p(LFP) >= 0, where f(wage)
real wages and g(a(Y n ))

,

(10)

is the distribution of mean-normalized

is the distribution of mean-normalized

reservation wages which are a function of non-wage income.

As

the distribution of asset income falls, the distribution of
normalized reservation wages also falls.

Therefore, if the

distribution of wages falls more than the distribution of
reservationJ wages, then the probability of labor force
participation will fall as the distributions converge.

It is

important to note that it is the absolute change in the
distribution of normalized wages and reservation wages, not the
percentage change, which determines changes in the participation
decision.

A measure of absolute normalized change for any

distribution of x is
12

(Xi (C=l) -X(C=O») •
~(f(x))=--~~~~-

(11)

If the distribution of reservation wages falls more than the
distribution of wages, then aggregate participation rates will
rise as the distance between their respective mean values
increase.

Predicting whether market hours will rise or fall in

these circumstances depends on whether the new after-tax wage is
above or below the market-hours maximizing (optimal) net wage.
If the new after-tax wage is above the optimal net wage, market
hours will increase, or vice versa.
Changing the mean value of after-tax non-wage income,
ceteris paribus, traces out the distribution of expected aftertax wages.

Changing the mean value of expected after-tax wages,

ceteris paribus, traces out the distribution of reservation
wages, which are a function of after-tax non-wage income.
Changing either non-wage income or wages under ceteris paribus
conditions causes changes in the labor force participation rate
in exactly opposite ways.

Figure 3 below shows the change in the

J

aggregate labor force participation rate as a function of the
change in the mean after-tax expected wage, assuming there is no
overlap in either of the distributions at the origin.
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FIGURE

3.

CHANGE IN AGGREGATE LFPR AS A FUNCTION OF THE
CHANGE IN MEAN AFTER - TAX EXPECTED WAGE

Figure 4 below shows the change in the aggregate labor force
participatlon rate as a function of the change in mean after-tax
non-wage income, once again assuming there is no
these distributions at the origin.
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FIGURE

4.
CHANGE IN AGGREGATE LFPR AS A FUNCTION OF
CHANGE IN MEAN AFTER-TAX NON-WAGE INCOME

From a policy standpoint, if an asset-income tax is imposed,
market hours and participation rates will always rise, ceteris
paribus.

If a linear wage tax is imposed and after-tax wages are

above the optimal wage, market hours will rise while
participation rates fall.

The same principle applies to non-

linear wage taxes, although the shape and placement o f the
optimal market-hours offer curve will be different.

?or example,

market hours will decrease faster above the optimal wage for a
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progressive tax structure than a linear one as wages are
increased.
If wages and asset income are simultaneously taxed at the
same rate, the effect on participation rates may be directly or
inversely related to changes in market hours, depending on the
after-tax values of non-wage income and the expected wage.

If it

is assumed that the majority of households within a particular
state have high asset income and moderate wages, then imposing a
linear tax which affects all income sources at the same rate will
cause the distribution of wages to fall less than the
distribution of reservation wages in absolute terms.

Market

hours, therefore, may fall while participation rates rise.
However, if households which have high non-wage income are
selectively taxed, where their expected after-tax wages are above
the optimum wage, then it is likely that market hours will rise
while participation rates may rise, fall or remain constant,
depending on the absolute magnitude of changes in the expected
wage and non-wage income.
To summarize, the problem of predicting participation rates,
and how those rates are correlated with work hours, breaks down
to an analysis of the normalized absolute change in reservation
wages and expected wages, and whether the after-tax expected wage
was reduced in the region above or below the optimum wage.

A

high change in non-wage income and a low change in expected
wages, for example, would be caused by applying a single tax rate
against income that is composed mainly of non-wage i n 2ome, with

16

relatively low wage income.

possible combinations of these

variables and the predicted signs are summarized in Table 1
below.
TABLE

Change in:
Wage
Yn
High
High
Low
Low
High
High
Low
Low

High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low

I--THE EFFECT OF INCREASING A UNIFORM INCOME TAX ON
MARKET HOURS AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION,
BY INCOME TYPE AND LEVEL l

Position of
After-Tax Wage
w
w
w
w
w
w
w
w

>
>
>
>
<
<
<
<

Hypothesized
Effect on:
Participation
Market Hours

w*
w*
w*
w*
w*
w*
w*
w*

+
+
+
+

+ or +

+ or + or -

+ or + or +

+ or -

+ or -

Assuming Constant Indifference Set and Linear Taxes.
(w* is the hours-optimizing wage)

1

As shown above, there are only two cases when participation
rates and hours worked are directly correlated (Low/High, w < w*;
High/Low, w > w*), and one case where there is an inverse
relationship (Low/High, w > w*) .
The impact of a combined wage and asset income tax on market
hours for

a~

average individual can be shown using the three-

dimensional offer surface provided in Figure 5.

This

representation shows market hours provided due to all possible
combinations of after-tax wages and non-wage income, with the
restriction that disposable non-wage income must be greater than
zero.
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I

Yn
FIGURE

5.

Reservation
Wage

MARKET HOURS OFFER SURFACE

Moving from point A to point B causes a reduction in the
after-tax wage and non-wage income, but increases the number of
market hours.

Further, it appears that the absolute reduction in

non-wage income is greater than the absolute reduction in the
wage; therefore, we may assume that participation rates will
increase as well.
The preceeding analysis confirms that labor force
participation mayor may not be directly correlated with changes
in market hours that occur due to changes in tax rates.

This

result can be provided as a partial explanation for why empirical
18

researchers have found little correlation between market hours
and net wages.

As some people reduce market hours due to

increased taxes, others increase hours while still others leave
6

or enter the labor market; a decision associated with fixed hours
constraints.

B.

Structural Model Development

The preceding theoretical discussion showed that if tax
payments do not completely flow back to households as perceived
public transfers, multiple combinations of effects on
participation rates and work hours are possible.

As mentioned

earlier, a simple test of whether representative households
perceive that tax revenues are flowing back to them in the form
of transfers is to examine variations in participation rates in
the presence of different tax rates, controlling for changes in
real income and other demographic variables.
A basic model to explain labor force participation can be
developed by acknowledging that the reservation wage is a
function of average non-wage income, which can be simply defined
)

as the average transfer payment plus average asset income.
Further, the expected wage for the representative individual is
the average wage, conditioned by the probability of receiving
that wage.

The probability of receiving a given wage can be

defined as one minus the unemployment rate.

The discussion above

assumes that the indifference set remains constant in shape and
placement.
19

The structural model becomes
LFPR=p(E(w) ,wr ),
E (w)

= (1 - UN) w,

wr=r(Yt,Ya ).

(12)

(13 )
(14)

Given that this model is for an average individual, there exists
a distribution around both the reservation and expected wages.
Therefore, as these mean values start to converge, we would
expect to observe greater overlap in their respective
distributions, thus causing observed aggregate participation
rates to fall.
As stated earlier, if one rejects the notion that only a
compensated substitution effect exists, then predicting the
change in participation rates due to taxes becomes somewhat more
difficult.

If the tax is structured in such a way that it

reduces asset income more than wages, then participation rates
may rise as taxes are imposed.

Further, if the tax maintains the

difference between the reservation wage and the expected wage,
albeit at 19wer levels for both, then participation rates should
remain constant.
With this information, the realism of the assumpt ion that
there is an exclusive compensated substitution effect can be
tested, by testing whether a significant relationship exists
between tax rates and participation rates.

The null

hypothesis in this case being that the coefficient associated
with taxes is less than zero.
20

c. The Empirical Model
Panel data for all fifty states over the period 1985 to 1990
were used for this study.

~ The

empirical model closely follows

the structural model shown above, where the budget constraint is
defined as the nominal wage (WAGEN), Average welfare payment per
r ecipient ho usehold (AID), per capita social security payment
(PCSS), the unemployment rate

(UN); and the percentage of

unemployed persons unemployed for fifteen weeks or more (DU).
The DU variable is included as an assumed directly related proxy
for variat i ons in the consumption of wealth, which reduces asset
in come.
Given that nominal wages, unemployment rates, duration of
unemployment, participation rates and transfer payments are
simultaneously determined in the market, fitted values of righthand side endogenous variables

(DU, WAGEN, UN, AID, PCSS) were

first obtained by separate fixed-effect and random-e=fect models
to avoid s i multaneity bias.

The set of exogenous variables that

were used t o obtain fitted values included eight dumny variables
to represent the nine census regions.
)

Including regional

identifiers modifies the assumption of statistical independence
between the states, to create a more realistic assumption of
re gional

i~terdependence .

Additional instruments included the

percentage of employment in the manufactur ing, service, and
agricultural sectors; percentage of the population over 65;
percentage of the state population with

foc~-year

degrees or

more ; percentage of workers in the manufact uri ng seCL o r who are
21

members of unions; dummy variable designating

whethe ~

the state

i s a right-to-work state; state population; percenta ge of
population designated as black and hispanic; a set

0:

five dummy

variables for the six year period; and the percentage of the
population who voted for the Republican Party in the 1986, 1988,
and 1990 elections.
The model that was used to generate the first-s_age fitted
values was determined by applying the Hausman Specification Error
test .

Selection results are provided in Table 2 bel ow .

TABLE

2--FIRST-STAGE EQUATION SELECTION RESULTS

Equation Selected

Hausman
Chi-Square

WAGEN (fixed effect)
UN (fixed effect)
DU (ran. effect)
PCSS (ran. effect)
AID (ran. effect)

73.55
92.93
35.06
12.09
19 . 74

p-Value
.0000
.0000
.0513
.9689
. 6575

Ac~

. R2

.90
.55
.18
.97
.52

Effective tax rates were calculated from the tax burdens for
a family of four with gross income of $25,000 for

sa~es

property (PTAX) , and income taxes

la~gest

(YTAX), for the

(STAX),
city in

)

each state.

A composite of all of the above taxes, plus

automobile licensing fees

(TAX), was also tested.

L:caloption

sales taxes were not included in the rates to allow :or statewide
comparison.

Property tax burdens are difficult to extrapolate to

a statewide comparison due to the fact that local government
entities may each have a different property tax rate structure,
and that property tax burdens are as much a functior. of property
22

values as tax rates .

Therefore , caution should be csed when

examining the impact due to property taxes.
Each tax rate was included into the reduced form equation
with the fitted endogenous variables individually in a separate
run .

The fixed-effects model, as opposed to the ra ndom-effects

model, proved to be the appropriate specification ir. each case,
as shown by the Hausman specification error test.

The

probability of error, given the chi-square distribut ion of the
test, was always less than .0000.

Further, an F-stat istic

testing whether the intercepts for all states were equal showed
that there was a significant difference between regular OLS
estimates and the fixed effect estimates.

The probanility of

error for the test was less than .0001 in all cases.

D. Results
The coefficients associated with the effective
were insignificant at the .05 level, with the
effective income tax.

~ax

except~on

rates
of the

Estimated coefficients for al_ variables

are shown i n Table 3 below.
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TABLE 3-- ECONOMETRIC RESULTS OF FIXED- EFFECTS MODELS
PREDICTING LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES AS A FUNCmrON OF
TAXES AND OTHER VARIABLES
Model

Variable

Dependent Variable:
Income Tax
(R 2 = .35)

Sales Tax
(R 2 = .34)

Property Tax
(R 2 = .35)

Total Tax
(R 2 =.34)

WAGENH
UNH
DUH
AIDH
PCSSH
YTAX
WAGENH
UNH
DUH
AIDH
PCSSH
STAX
WAGENH
UNH
DUH
AIDH
PCSSH
PTAX
WAGENH
UNH
DUH
AIDH
PCSSH
TAX

E.

Coefficient

t-statistic

LFPR
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.000408
.151
.05
.0002
.298
.292

3.80
-1.25
1.91
-1.63
-1.44
-1.96

.00039
. 11
.051
.00018
.00003
.003

3.60
.93
1.93
-1.47
-1.33
.21

.0004
.12
.05
.00016
.000031
.087

3.69
.98
1.93
-1.31
-1.50
1.55

.00039
.11
.05
.00018
.000029
.029

3.62
.92
1.92
-1.43
-1.39
.56

-

-

-

Interpretation of Results

The signs associated with each of the variables can be
explained using some combinations of economic theory.

The

positive relationship between wages and labor force partic i pation
rates implies that the expected wage is rising
reservation wage, which would then increase the
rate.

24

relat~ve

to the

part~cipat ~o n

As d iscussed e a r li er , i nc r eas ing u nemp lo ymen t rate s decr ease
the expected wage t oward t he reservation wage, and t h u s the
negative s i gn.

Further, t he l o n ge r t he du r a t ion o f u nemp l oyment

observed in a state, the lower the wealth balance, a nd the higher
will be the participation ra te.

This result provides evidence in

favor of the "added worker" e f fect hypothesized by Lundberg
(1985) and others.

As expected, the larger the value of transfer

payments (AID, PCSS) the less will be the participat i on rate as
non-wage income rises.
As indicated, the coefficient associated with t h e income tax
is significant in the negative direction.

This implies that the

substitution effect of the tax is greater than its income effect.
A number of things can be inferred from the

insignif ~ cance

rest of the tax coefficients, including the

rejectio~

of the

of the null

hypothesis of this paper, that higher taxes are alwa y s correlated
with a lower participation rate, after controlling for variations
in monetary income.

From the results presented above, it can be

inferred that people do not fully perceive the public benefits
provided at the state level, where public benefits

a~e

more

visible as Jopposed to federal benefits, as transfer ~ncome.
Quite the contrary, the signs of the tax coefficients for sales,
property and total taxes, while insignificant, are p ositive
rather than negative.

25

F.

Conclusions

If all tax revenues are used to create government goods and
services, but these goods and services are

not ~

all perceived by

individuals as transfer income, the impact of taxes on market
hours and participation rates becomes a function of income and
substitution effects associated with changing expected wages, and
income effects associated with changing asset income.

This study

does not necessarily support the notion that only a compensated
substitution effect exists due to all forms of taxation.

Rather,

this research tends to support the research of Hausman and Ruud
(1984) and Triest (1990), who found little or no connection
between tax rates and labor supply.

However, with respect to the

income tax, there appears to be at least some compensating
effect.
This research also provides moderate support for an addedworker effect, which may cause higher levels of participation due
to target income earning preferences of households.

This higher

level of participation is associated with changes in the level of
domestic service within households, and, assuming that market
)

hours are inelastic with respect to net wages, a

red~ction

in

individual and household utility, and therefore social welfare
during long periods of unemployment.
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Appendi x
All data related to wages, labor force par t ic i pation, and
employment by sector were collected from Employment and Wages:
Annual Averages or Geographic Profile of Employment and
Unemployment published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Tax

data were collected from the District of Columbia which completes
a yearly cross-sectional study of effective tax rates in a
publication called Tax Rates and Tax Burdens in the Di str i ct of
Columbia :

A Nationwide Comparison .

Data for all remaining

variables were collected from the Statistical Abstract of the
United States.
Eight dummy variables were created to represent nine regions
in the first stage estimation of median household income and
unemployment.

These regions are defined as:

Region

State

New England
(REGl)

Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut

Middle Atlantic
(REG2 )

New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania

East North Cent.
(REG3 )

Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin
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West North Cent.
(REG4 )

Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas

South Atlantic
(REGS)

Delaware
Maryland
Virginia
W. Virginia
N. Carolina
S. Carolina
Georgia
Florida

East So. Cent.
(REG6)

Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi

West So. Cent.
(REG7 )

Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas

Mountain
(REG8 )

Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada

Pacific

Washington
Oregon
California
Alaska
Hawaii
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